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What’s going around? A social network explanation of youth 
party membership
by Emilien Paulis
ternative and less institutionalised forms of participation, under-
cutting parties’ role as vehicles of their participation (Norris 2002; 
Loader et al. 2014). It is worth noting the exception of green 
parties, which stand out by being the party family recruiting the 
most among younger age cohorts and exhibiting positive trends in 
terms of membership figures over time in Europe (Delwit 2011; 
Van Haute/Gauja 2015). Furthermore, party membership decline 
is accelerated by the emergence of the Internet, social media and 
new technologies, which have decoupled the avenues and chan-
nels through which the citizens’ voice might be heard, and thus 
affected the organisation and recruitment function of political 
parties (Dalton/Wattenberg 2000; Gibson 2017).
On the other hand, the literature agrees with a common feature: 
people who are male, older, better educated, politically interested, 
trusting of institutions, satisfied with democracy, identified with a 
party, and/or involved in civic participation are all the more likely 
to join a party (Seyd/Whiteley 2004; Heidar 2007; Van Haute/
Gauja 2015). This main finding reflects the well-known social 
and political inequalities inherent to political participation and 
a certain lack of representativeness of party members. Hence, it 
is empirically acknowledged that younger people are less likely to 
join a party (Hooghe et al. 2004; Quintelier 2007) as they would 
be less concerned with and interested in politics, less politically 
knowledgeable, more apathetic, or participate less in other social 
or political activities (Roker 2005; O’toole et al. 2003). If it is 
puzzling to find out that macro evolutions – providing citizens 
with generally better access to resources of all kinds – have not 
translated into an increase of party members (Persson 2014), it is 
all the more intriguing regarding younger generations, which are 
supposed to have benefited the most from recent advances.
What this calls for is to look for alternatives to aggregate-level 
patterns or individual-level dynamics driving party membership, 
especially regarding younger citizens who have de facto less re-
sources and whose participation might be triggered and mediated 
by other factors. This paper puts the emphasis on one important 
and less systematically explored meso-level factor, interpersonal 
networks, and questions how it affects the chances of joining a 
party. The paper contends that individuals’ political attitudes and 
behaviours do not form randomly, in a social vacuum, but in close 
relation and interaction with significant social peers. Hence, it is 
argued that it is not individual characteristics per se that matter for 
understanding party mobilisation, but rather individuals’ features 
in relation with the characteristics of their proximate social envi-
ronment. More specifically, social networks are expected to play 
bstract: Because people do not join political parties in a 
social vacuum but rather in close relation with their peers, 
this paper explores how the structure and composition of 
interpersonal, social networks affect youth party membership, and 
questions the answer’s implications for recruitment. The structure does 
not affect statistically the young citizens’ probability of becoming party 
members, as the process depends to a high degree on their proximate 
network core, e.g. their relatives, pointing towards a certain exclusiv-
ity in recruitment patterns and giving insight also on why they might 
stay away from conventional politics. A homogeneous composition 
matching with a high social and political profile is a pattern that has 
a considerable impact on their odds of joining a party, stressing that 
social networks can work in reproducing social and political inequal-
ities, confining recruitment targets to the national population’s most 
“usual suspects”, and thereby explaining some difficulties faced by par-
ty organisations. Drawing on these findings, the conclusion discusses 
strategic considerations for Belgian parties.
Keywords: Youth, Party membership, Social network, Interpersonal 
relationship
Introduction
The celebration of the 50th anniversary of May 1968’s events re-
called that younger generations can generate large, mass social 
and political movements, by asking for more involvement and in-
fluence on the way politics is conducted. More broadly, May 1968 
constitutes an historical shift in citizens’ mentalities and attitudes 
towards traditional politics and embodies the materialisation of a 
latent citizen dissatisfaction challenging traditional institutions, 
which does not seem to have vanished since then. Notwithstan-
ding, citizens’ commitment to traditional politics, crudely mea-
sured through union and party membership, as well as more fre-
quently through turnout, is clearly on the wane in most Western 
democracies (Norris 2002; Dalton 2008; Van Biezen et al. 2012).
Looking at the decline of party membership more closely, both 
demand- and supply-side explanations are proposed (Kölln 2014; 
Van Haute/Gauja 2015). On the one hand, the erosion of parties’ 
recruiting capacity suggests a decreasing organisational density 
and less societal penetration, which are taken as indicators of par-
ty change or decline (Katz/Mair 1995; Van Biezen et al. 2012). 
This broadly negative picture about party membership could 
illustrate a larger democratic crisis, a gap between citizens and 
politics, questioning the role of these organisations as represent-
ative institutions. The progressive undermining of representative 
systems and their elites’ legitimacy consequently reinforces the 
wider process of citizen disillusionment and partisan dealignment 
(Webb 2006; Dalton 2013; Smith 2014). The gap with the youth 
could be even deeper, especially regarding traditional parties 
embodying the “old politics” (Quintelier 2007; Mycock/Tonge 
2012). This younger population segment is more interested in al-
A
This broadly negative picture about party membership 
could illustrate a larger democratic crisis, a gap between 
citizens and politics, questioning the role of these organ­
isations as representative institutions.
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all the more in the process of younger citizens’ party mobilisation 
for two reasons: (1) their political attitudes and behaviours are less 
stable, more volatile, and therefore more subject to peer-influence 
(Settle et al. 2011); (2) they reported proportionally the “some-
one asked” reason for joining as more important than their older 
fellows in this dataset (Paulis 2018).
The paper focuses, first, on the effect of the network structure 
(size/density), which is used as a proxy for social integration. 
Larger and denser networks are expected to increase the chances 
of joining a party. Second, the impact of network composition 
is explored in two areas: one hypothesis relates to the network 
nodes’ social and political attributes and their homogeneity (in 
terms of political attitudes and socio-demographics), whereas 
another expectation pertains to attributes of the ties. Networks 
tending towards more similarity on high-level of attributes (pos-
itive attitudes, high socio-demographic profiles) are expected to 
affect positively the odds of joining a political party, reflecting that 
social networks could tend to reinforce participation inequalities 
rather than overcome them. Moreover, family ties are expected 
to remain the main channel of party membership for younger 
citizens. It would, it seems, point toward a certain exclusivity in 
recruitment patterns of political parties, despite macro socio-eco-
nomic evolutions and organisational attempts that should have 
diversified the gates to enter parties as a member. These hypothe-
ses are tested using cross-sectional survey data gathered online in 
2016 among a representative sample of Belgian citizens (based on 
age, gender and region of residence). Furthermore, party mem-
bership appears a relevant dependent variable to measure young 
citizens’ conventional participation in Belgium given that voting 
is compulsory.
Theory
The paper tries somewhat to bridge the divide between the 
supply- and demand-side of party membership studies. De-
mand-side studies are interested in explaining party member-
ship fluctuations as a result of macro-level societal evolutions or 
 anchored in party organisation theories, whereas major accounts 
at the indivi dual level (supply side) are inspired by classic theories 
of political participation (Leighley 1995). The “General Incen-
tives Model” (Seyd/Whiteley 1992, 2002; Whiteley/Seyd 2002; 
Whiteley et al. 2006) provides tools for addressing issues such as 
who joins (resource model: socio-economic status), why (ratio-
nal choice model: incentives and motivations), and what  opinions 
they hold (socio-psychological model: political attitudes). Seyd 
and Whiteley’s ground-breaking investigations on British party 
members sparked many other single-case (e.g. Gallagher et al. 
2002; Heidar/Saglie 2003; Pedersen et al. 2004; Den Ridder et 
al. 2011; Lisi/Espritio Santo 2017) or comparative applications 
(Heidar 2007; Van Haute/Gauja 2015). All point towards a key 
empirical finding: higher socio-economic status and positive 
 political attitudes make people more likely to join a party. If these 
explanations are robust, especially to account for youth party 
membership (Bruter/Harrison 2009), few contributions have 
 really questioned how social networks might play a part in repro-
ducing (or overcoming) social and political inequalities, mediat-
ing the membership process and thereby affecting the recruiting 
patterns of political parties.
While references to “social networks” in the main explanations 
of party membership can be found, to our knowledge, none used 
systematically Social Network Analysis (SNA) as theoretical and 
methodological background to operationalise the concept. A so-
cial network is defined as “a set of relationships between actors, 
or sets of actors” (Wasserman/Faust 1994). The adoption of such 
an approach supposes agreement with four essential assumptions: 
actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent, autonomous units; relational ties between actors 
are channels for the transfer or “flow” of resources (either ma-
terial or nonmaterial); models focusing on individuals view the 
network structural environment as providing opportunities for 
or constraints on individual action; network models conceptu-
alise structure (social, economic, political and so forth) as lasting 
patterns of relations among actors. Political scientists studying 
conventional participation have long been dominated by the in-
dividualism of their field (Lazer 2011). This is intriguing as there 
is a strong SNA-based sociological tradition that stresses the influ-
ence played by networks in the process of involvement in uncon-
ventional forms of participation (Diani/McAdam 2003), which 
might have been applied to study conventional participation and 
engagement in political parties. Secondly, Columbia scholars laid 
the foundations for a network approach of traditional political be-
haviours, for instance with their two-step flow of communication 
theory that stresses the role of influential others in channelling 
political information between mass media and ordinary citizens. 
Some scholars have nonetheless reread the classic school of social 
influence through the lenses of social network theory and analy-
sis (Eulau 1980; Knoke 1990; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Zukerman 
2005; Sinclair 2012), using genuine network data that were miss-
ing in the past. Overall, this line of research emphasises social net-
works and their features as significant factors shaping the process 
of electoral mobilisation (voting and campaign involvement) and 
vote choice. The influence of kinship, friendship, or weaker social 
ties as channels for political engagement is also a central topic 
of discussion (La Due Lake/Huckfeldt 1998; Zúñiga/Valenzuela 
2011). Hence, these modern network theories of political parti-
cipation and social influence provide interesting alternative the-
oretical avenues to cope with youth party membership, focusing 
either on the effects of network structure or composition (Knoke 
1990).
In terms of structure, social network size and density can be used 
as a proxy for social integration, which has been demonstrated to 
impact positively the odds of participating in the political process 
(Knoke 1990; La Due Lake/Huckfeldt 1998; Teorell 2000; Mc-
Clurg 2003; Sinclair 2012). An extensive social network supposes 
more connections to other social peers and extends the chances 
[I]ndividuals’ political attitudes and behaviours do not 
form randomly, in a social vacuum, but in close relation 
and interaction with significant social peers.
[T]his line of research emphasises social networks and 
their features as significant factors shaping the process 
of electoral mobilisation (voting and campaign invol­
vement) and vote choice.
Larger and denser networks are expected to increase the 
chances of joining a party.
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of being related to people who are themselves already politically 
engaged and likely to affect the mobilisation process. Interperson-
al networks allow the effective recruitment of people in political 
activities by helping exchanges of relevant political information 
and enlarging the exposure to, as well as understanding of, politics 
(Huckfeldt et al. 2004), reinforcing participation as a desirable 
social norm (Bond et al. 2017), and encouraging the circulation 
of various resources’ (Jan 2009; Lim 2008; Lin 2008). Further-
more, a denser network, where peers know each other to a larger 
extent, supposes more fluid exchanges of information, but also 
more  social cohesiveness, trust and pressure (Burt 2005), patterns 
that can affect the chances of joining, especially if those peers 
are already affiliated. In so far as younger citizens rely generally 
on smaller networks than their older fellows, the first hypothe-
sis  expects from those with larger and denser social networks to 
 encourage party membership (H1).
In terms of composition, the focus can be, first, on the ties binding 
the network and the attributes of these relationships. To account 
for the fact that networks connect individuals who are tied to 
each other in varying degrees of closeness and intimacy, scholars 
distinguish between “strong” and “weak” ties (Granovetter 1973). 
The first ones are durable and established with intimates who pro-
vide support, are frequently in touch or are kin (Marsden 1990), 
whereas the second imply more social distance and less frequency 
of contact. Both types are shown to affect political participation 
(Lim 2008; Zuniga/Valenzuela 2011). Although early studies 
on personal influence emphasised the power of strong-tie net-
works for political recruitment (Katz/Lazarsfeld 1955), weak 
ties have become more prominent and more relevant for politi-
cal participation as a result of the socio-economic modernisation 
process that tends to decrease social distance between individuals 
(Huckfeldt et al. 1995). While there is evidence supporting an 
increasing significance of weak ties for political involvement, the 
influence of strong relations must not be dismissed as sources of 
mobilisation in conventional participation (Zuckerman 2005; 
Cross/Young 2008). Networks dominated by strong ties tend to 
face less political disagreement and generate more participation 
in representative institutions (Mutz 2002). The second hypoth-
esis expects family ties to remain the most significant channels 
of youth party membership (H2). Nonetheless, the mobilising 
role of strong ties could mean also that parties are quite exclusive 
in their recruitment patterns (Cross/Young 2008) and that if the 
family network core is not connected to politics, this configura-
tion might be a crucial source of non-political engagement among 
young people.
Second, social networks of all kinds tend towards homophily in 
their composition (birds of a feather flocks together, or the echo 
chamber effect): people sharing similar characteristics, or attrib-
utes, tend to cluster together within social networks (McPherson 
et al. 2001; Lazer et al. 2009; Evans/Fu 2018). Social network 
effects are tricky to grasp because networks do not form random-
ly. Individuals are at once “creators and captives” of their social 
networks: they generate intentionally their networks throughout 
their life, and form ties with similar and like-minded others (so-
cial selection), but these networks, in turn, provide constraints 
and opportunities on their life choices (social influence). Adapted 
to the political realm, a dynamic process of co-evolution between 
individuals’ political attitudes and behaviours and their networks 
can be found: they tend to become more similar to and to comply 
with their network fellows in terms of political views, but they 
also look for politically similar others. This paper is interested in 
the effect of homogeneous network composition, leaving aside 
the issue of network diversity. It assumes that homophily, or the 
congruence that may exist in a network –meaning that ego (sur-
vey respondent) and alters (network peers) are similar on a given 
attribute (same views, values, opinions, socio-demographic pro-
file, etc.), and that these attributes are positive (e.g. congruent on 
a high level of interest or satisfaction) – might be an important 
factor influencing the odds of joining a party among the youth. 
Homophilic networks converging towards a higher level of social 
and political attributes are expected to increase the chance of a 
young citizen joining a party (H3). The hypothesis is discussed, 
nonetheless, as to whether social networks might actually work in 
reproducing social and political inequalities, embedding and con-
fining people in a highly homogeneous environment, and there-
by bringing less diversity in party recruitment patterns (similar 
“high” profiles predominantly recruited by parties).
Data and methods
Data collection
Acknowledging that it is a widespread, conventional technique to 
collect and generate information on party membership (Scarrow/
Gezgor 2010; Whiteley 2011; Ponce/Scarrow 2016) and social 
networks (Marsden 2011; Crossley et al. 2015), the paper capi-
talised on a cross-sectional survey to gather original data. It was 
conducted online by an external company (Qualtrics) between 
June and July 2016 among a non-random quota sample of 2,801 
Belgian citizens, based on the Belgian population’s characteristics 
(gender, age, and region of residence). Regarding networks specif-
ically, relying on an online survey platform “substantially reduces 
the costs, time and fatigue in managing the complex questionnaire 
required for data collection of ego-centered data” (Manfreda et al. 
2004: 295), and moderates the face-to-face or phone-call inter-
viewer effect (Eagle/Proeshold-Bell 2015). Moreover, it could 
lead sometimes to a better quality and reliability of network data 
 (Coromina/Coenders 2006; Matzat/Snijders 2010).
Two main components were encompassed in the design of the 
questionnaire. First, traditional sets of questions existing in sur-
vey research into political participation (Gibson/Cantijoch 2013) 
were used to collect information on the respondents themselves: 
their political behaviours (party membership and other forms of 
participation), political attitudes (satisfaction, interest, and party 
identification), and socio-demographics (gender, education, and 
age). Second, as the primary purpose was to capture social net-
works as the main independent variable, the most critical meth-
odological issue was to generate network data for each respond-
ent. This type of network survey measurement supposes collecting 
An extensive social network supposes more connections 
to other social peers and extends the chances of being 
related to people who are themselves already politically 
engaged and likely to affect the mobilisation process.
[I]f the family network core is not connected to politics, 
this configuration might be a crucial source of non­poli­
tical engagement among young people.
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egocentric, personal network data, as everything is elicited from 
the perspective of one respondent (ego). The research opts for 
the most common and straightforward tool to reach them: the 
name-generating procedure (Burt 1984), consisting in a three-
step process.1
First, the “name-generator” elicits a list of individuals’ names on 
the basis of a specific social interaction. In this study, respond-
ents were asked to name up to 10 “significant others”, i.e. people 
who are particularly important to them and with whom they have 
regular contact (Crossley et al. 2015). Second, the “name-inter-
relater” asks about potential connections between these “alters” 
(i.e. whether they know each other). This step enables the egocen-
tric network to turn into small sociometric networks and to bring 
network density into the equation (Aeby 2016). These two first 
steps are essential as they allow researchers to map the structure 
of the network and then to reach related indicators (network size 
and density). Third, the “name-interpreter” consists in collecting 
information (attributes) about network nodes and relationships 
(network composition). On the one hand, respondents had to 
specify in a pre-defined list of nine social ties how they were con-
nected to their network peers.2 On the other, they reported, for 
their peers, similar information to what they did for themselves: 
socio-demographics (age, gender, education), political attitudes 
(interest, satisfaction, party identification) and behaviours (party 
membership and other forms of political participation).3
The Belgian population constitutes a relevant and fruitful empir-
ical case to investigate the network mechanism of (youth)  party 
membership for two reasons. First, voting being compulsory, 
the main measurement of (youth) conventional participation is 
party membership. Second, although Belgian parties have faced 
membership loss (Van Haute et al. 2013), they have been less 
affected than other Western democracies (Scarrow/Gezgor 2010). 
The proportion of the national population affiliated to a party 
remains rather significant, probably due to the historical societal 
penetration of mass Belgian parties in their own pillar (Deschou-
wer 2012). Moreover, membership in youth party organisations 
being a crucial pre-requisite for a political career in Belgian poli-
tics (Hooghe et al. 2004), it means that parties do recruit young-
er citizens via, among other things, their youth organisations. 
Therefore, there are samples of (young) party members that can 
be reached prospectively or retrospectively in order to test new 
hypotheses. 
Data analysis
Once collected, raw survey data were cleaned and split into 
two distinct datasets. The first one includes only network data 
 collected through the name-generating procedure, organised to 
be computed in E-Net software (Haglin/Borgatti 2012). The 
latter permits one social network analysis treating the 2801 net-
works, visualising them and exporting derived structural as well 
as compositional variables. The second dataset centralises both 
network-level (IV) and individual-level (DV) derived variables 
in order to run summary and multivariate analyses via standard 
 statistical software (SPSS).
Data description, operationalisation and bivariate statistics
Dependent variable: party membership
Not surprisingly given existing empirical contributions in the field 
(Bruter/Harrison 2009; Bennie/Russel 2012), the survey empha-
sises young citizens’ low level of involvement in political parties 
(see Figure 1 below). Among the 18-35 years’ cohort, 4.3% of 
respondents reported to be currently affiliated to a political party. 
In contrast, this figure rises to 7.2% for older categories, which 
points to a generational difference in favour of the oldest, all the 
more if former members are counted too.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of party members among the 
sample of respondent according the two age groups guiding the 
empirical analysis. It points out respondents’ low level of involve-
ment in Belgian political parties, notably among the youth.
From this information, one binary dependent variable “par-
ty membership” was recoded for each respondent (see Table 1). 
To satisfy analytical requirements and overcome the small N of 
current young members, as well as given their singular profiles 
compared to the rest of the population (Paulis 2018), respond-
ents who have never been formally affiliated to a political party 
and never socialised in a party organisation were distinguished 
from former and current members (0 never affiliated; 1 former/
current member). The dependent variable’s binary form led to the 
performance of logistic regressions in order to gauge the effect of 
different independent variables, i.e. social network structure and 
composition.
Independent variables: social network structure and composition
Regarding network structure, two indicators are taken into 
 account as a proxy for social integration. First, network size refers 
to the number of people named in the name-generator. It ranges 
from 1 to 10 for respondents who took the opportunity to the full 
and named 10 network peers.4 On average, respondents named 
between 6 and 7 “significant others” (6.2). Second, social network 
density describes the connectivity among respondents’ social 
 networks, based on the ties reported in the name-interrelater. The 
Homophilic networks converging towards a higher level 
of social and political attributes are expected to increase 
the chance of a young citizen joining a party.
Figure 1 (Neu mit größerer Schrift) 
 
 
 
Table 2 (Neu mit schmaleren Spalten) 
 
  N Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Network 
size 
18-35y 814 1 10 5.9 3.525 
− Member 70   5.8  
− Non-member 1631   5.9  
36-65+ 1987 1 10 6.3 3.495 
− Member 356   6.7  
− Non-member 1631   5.9  
Total 2801 1 10 6.2 3.508 
Network 
density 
18-35y 814 0 1 .49 .351 
− Member 70   .55  
− Non-member 1631   .48  
36-65+ 1987 0 1 .52 .347 
− Member 356   .53  
− Non-member 1631   .51  
Total 2801 0 1 .51 .348 
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Figure 1: Party membership differential between young and old 
 respondents
 N Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Party membership 18-35y 814 0 1 .09 .281 
36-65y+ 1987 0 1 .18 .384 
Total 2801 0 1 .15 .359 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of party membership (DV)
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indicator ranges from 0 to 1, when all the nodes are connected to 
each other and form a perfect “clique”. The mean value for the 
whole population (.51) suggests that, on average, half of potential 
ties were effective in the observed networks. This relatively high 
density ratio reflects the very social nature of networks mapped in 
this research and the pre-dominance of strong ties in respondents’ 
proximate environment (see below), which suppose de facto more 
chances for alters to know each other and consequently to be tied 
to each other. Bivariate analyses suggest that younger respondents 
have slightly smaller and less dense networks than older ones (see 
Table 2). More striking is how “old” party members have larger 
networks compared to younger members and older unaffiliated 
citizens, whereas young party members stand out from the rest 
with much denser networks.5 Hence, multivariate analyses should 
help in untangling whether the effect of network size and density 
has to be distinguished at the network structural level.
Data description becomes more interesting when looking at 
the composition of social networks. Regarding the attributes of 
 relationships, relatives (spouse, DNA and extended family) repre-
sent more than 42.4% of the people named by the respondents, 
pointing to the prominence of strong ties. In contrast, weaker 
social ties are less frequently named as significant others. Eight 
continuous independent variables summarise the number of alters 
in each category (see Table 3). When disaggregating between the 
two age groups, younger respondents tend to name fewer rela-
tives belonging to their extended family, more friends, and less 
weak ties (members met in the organisation, professional advisors 
or acquaintances). Interestingly, taking party membership into 
 account, if young party members report fewer friends than young 
non-affiliates, the reverse holds for older members. Overall, biva-
riate analyses support the idea that younger, and, above all, old-
er party members present more tie diversity in their networks, 
 reporting proportionally fewer close relatives and more distant 
social relations, and suggesting the potential role of weak ties.
Regarding the attributes of network nodes, Tables 4 and 5 put 
in perspective the descriptive statistics of the social (Table 4) and 
 political (Table 5) features of respondents and their alters. In terms 
Figure 1 (Neu mit größerer Schrift) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of network structure (IV)
  N Min Max Mean Std Dev p value ANOVA 
Spouse 18-35 814 0 1 .46 .518 .217 
− Member 70   .41   
− Non-member 744   .47   
36-65+ 1987 0 2 .44 .511  
− Member 356   .48   
− Non-member 744   .43   
Total 2801 0 3 .4 .513  
DNA family 18-35 814 0 10 1.16 1.465 .423 
− Member 70   .9   
− Non-member 744   1.18   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 1.13 1.665  
− Member 356   1.04   
− Non-member 744   1.15   
Total 2801 0 10 1.1 1.609  
Extended family 18-35 814 0 9 .79 1.382 .000 
− Member 70   .76   
− Non-member 744   .8   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 1.1 1.692  
− Member 356   1.1   
− Non-member 744   1.1   
Total 2801 0 10 1.03 1.615  
Friend 18-35 814 0 10 2.42 1.5 .025 
− Member 70   2.2   
− Non-member 744   2.4   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 2.17 2.454  
− Member 356   2.4   
− Non-member 744   2.1   
Total 2801 0 10 2.24 2.511  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of network composition: social ties (IV)
  N Min Max Mean Std Dev p value ANOVA 
Colleague 18-35 814 0 8 .53 1.193 .859 
− Member 70   .6   
− Non-member 744   .5   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 .5 1.214  
− Member 356   .4   
− Non-member 744   .5   
Total 2801 0 10 .51 1.208  
Organisation member 18-35 814 0 8 .16 .633 .000 
− Member 70   .3   
− Non-member 744   .1   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 .37 1.172  
− Member 356   .3   
− Non-member 744   .6   
Total 2801 0 10 .31 1.049  
Professional advisor 18-35 814 0 7 .18 .682 .000 
− Member 70   .2   
− Non-member 744   .1   
36-65+ 1987 0 10 .37 1.009  
− Member 356   .4   
− Non-member 744   .3   
Total 2801 0 10 .31 .930  
Acquaintance 18-35 814 0 2 .02 .151 .046 
− Member 70   .06   
− Non-member 744   .02   
36-65+ 1987 0 7 .04 .306  
− Member 356   .06   
− Non-member 744   .04   
Total 2801 0 7 .04 .270  
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of socio-demographics (gender, age and education), the profiles of 
respondents and alters are quite similar. Three observations de-
serve to be stressed, however. First, respondents tend to name to a 
larger extent alters belonging to the same age group as themselves. 
Second, younger respondents reported higher levels of education 
for themselves and their alters than older parti cipants, indicat-
ing the younger generations’ better access to education. Third, 
the gender gap in favour of male party members (Van Haute/
Gauja 2015) is confirmed and all the more supported regarding 
younger party members, while both young and old party mem-
bers reported proportionally more females in their networks than 
unaffiliated respondents. Given the theoretical argument devel-
oped by the paper, the EI index of homophily (Crossley et al. 
2015) is applied to measure the similarity, or congruence between 
ego and alters on each socio-demographic attribute. Despite rel-
atively similar mean values for ego and alters, the index indicates 
networks converging rather towards social heterophily (negative 
scores). There is a slight contrast between younger and older citi-
zens’ social networks, with the former facing somewhat more ho-
mophily in terms of age than the latter. Furthermore, respondents 
identified as unaffiliated have more homophily in their network 
than non-members when education is scrutinised, while young 
party members obviously stand out from older party members 
(as well as other respondents) with much less gender homophily.
When jumping to political attitudes, if respondents are more in-
terested in politics than satisfied with the way democracy works, 
this observation is valid also for their alters. Obviously, party 
members display more positive political attitudes for themselves 
and their close environment than unaffiliated respondents, and 
this trend is even more marked among younger members. The 
indexes of attitudinal homophily computed on that basis reveal 
that respondents’ networks tend more towards political hetero-
phily (negative scores), and again despite the very similar mean 
values for ego and alters. However, the EI index for party identifi-
cation is very close to zero (-.1) and turns positive (i.e. homophi-
lic) when party members are distinguished from other respond-
ents. Interestingly, the homophily based on party identification 
is stronger among young party members. Finally, in terms of 
political behaviours, one variable controls for exposure to party 
membership. The mean value is as low (.1) as for respondents, 
but logically increases when networks of both younger and older 
party members are distinguished. Almost a half of their alters for 
which information is available tends to be generally affiliated to 
a party as well.
Overall, descriptive and bivariate statistics suggest three important 
nuances to our first expectations, which are assessed through the 
next multivariate models. First, if party members have generally 
larger and denser networks than unaffiliated citizens, it does not 
seem to be the case for young party members, but should rather 
be related to older members’ structural patterns. Second, in so far 
as party members have more tie diversity in their networks, weak-
er social ties might be also relevant channels of party membership. 
Third, party members display, in fact, less homophily than unaf-
filiated citizens within their social networks, except when poli tical 
satisfaction and, above all, party identification are scrutinised. 
Hence, multivariate analyses further question whether it might 
be that homophily, to affect party membership, is mediated by 
the level of the concerned attribute. To answer this, two types of 
independent variables were finally computed. Respondents were 
reorganised into categories according to the feature of their net-
work composition in two ways (see the distribution in Figure 2): 
Table 4 (für schärfere Qualität) 
 
 Ego Alters Homophily 
 N Min Max Mean Mean Min Max Mean 
Age 18-35 814 1 3  1.4 -1 1 -.219 
− Member 70    1.4   -.291 
− Non-member 744    1.4   -.213 
36-65+ 1987 1 3  2.2 -1 1 -.334 
− Member 356    2.2   -.313 
− Non-member 744    2.2   -.331 
Total 2801 1 3  1.9 -1 1 -.3 
Gender 18-35 814 0 1 .4 .4 -1 1 -.281 
− Member 70   .7 .4   -.351 
− Non-member 744   .4 .5   -.274 
36-65+ 1987 0 1 .5 .4 -1 1 -.272 
− Member 356   .6 .4   -.235 
− Non-member 744   .5 .5   -.280 
Total 2801 0 1 .5 .4 -1 1 -.275 
Education  18-35 814 1 4 2.7 2.6 -1 1 -.389 
− Member 70   2.9 2.7   -.431 
− Non-member 744   2.7 2.6   -.385 
36-65+ 1987 1 4 2.5 2.5 -1 1 -.392 
− Member 356   2.7 2.7   -.408 
− Non-member 744   2.5 2.5   -.388 
Total 2801 1 4 2.6 2.6 -1 1 -.391 
 
  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of network composition (IV): 
social attributes
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of network composition (IV): 
political attributes
Table 5 (mit schmaleren Spalten) 
 
 Ego Alters Homophily 
 N Min Max Mean Mean Min Max Mean 
Political 
interest 
18-35 814 1 4 2.5 2.5 -1 1 -.2 
− Member 70   3.1 2.8   -.4 
− Non-member 744   2.4 2.4   -.2 
36-65+ 1987   2.7 2.5   -.2 
− Member 346   3.2 2.7   -.3 
− Non-member 1631   2.6 2.4   -.2 
Total 2801   2.6 2.5   -.2 
Political 
satisfaction  
18-35 814 1 4 2.3 2.4 -1 1 -.6 
− Member 70   2.6 2.7   -.4 
− Non-member 744   2.2 2.3   -.6 
36-65+ 1987   2.1 2.1   -.7 
− Member 346   2.2 2.3   -.6 
− Non-member 1631   2 2.1   -.7 
Total 2801   2.2 2.2   -.7 
Party 
identification 
18-35 814 0 1 .7 .7 -1 1 -.1 
− Member 70   .9 .9   .4 
− Non-member 744   .6 .7   -.1 
36-65+ 1987 0 1 .7 .7 -1 1 -.1 
− Member 346   .8 .8   .2 
− Non-member 1631   .6 .7   -.1 
Total 2801 0 1 .7 .7 -1 1 -.1 
Party 
membership 
18-35 814 0 1 .2 .1    
− Member 70    .5    
− Non-member 744    .1    
36-65+ 1987 0 1 .2 .1    
− Member 346    .4    
− Non-member 1631    .1    
Total 2801 0 1 .1 .1    
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first, whether the network that they belong to tends to be homo-
philic on a given social or political attribute (i.e. positive EI score 
recoded into 1, versus the other, 0), and, second, whether this 
network tends to be “positively” homophilic, meaning congruent 
on a higher score or categories (1: yes; otherwise, 0)
Attribute homophily (binary)
Positive attribute homophily (binary)
The upper figure illustrates the distribution of homophilic net-
works on each social and political attribute among the sample 
of respondents, operationalised as binary variable (1=homophilic 
network, i.e. positive EI index - dark grey; 0 = heterophilic, i.e. 
negative EI index – light grey). The lower figure shows the distri-
bution of the variables measuring more specifically when homo-
phily coincides with higher attribute scores or categories (dark 
grey).
The following paragraphs present the results of two sets of empir-
ical models. The first one (M1) focuses on the effect of network 
structure (size and density) and one component of network com-
position: social and political homophily. The second (M2) looks 
more closely at the effect of social ties on the chances of joining 
a party.
Multivariate analysis
Network structure
The first set of models’ output (M1) presented by Table 6 suggests 
interesting results regarding the effect of network structure on the 
probability of joining a party. Both social network size and den sity 
follow the positive relation expected by the theoretical hypothesis, 
although it is statistically significant only regarding network size. 
Furthermore, the model confirms the nuances implied by bivariate 
analyses. On the one hand, social network size increases positively 
the odds of party membership, but this effect prevails significantly 
only for older respondents. On the other hand, network density 
seems to affect more youth party membership when coefficients 
and odds ratios are considered. However, the relationship turns 
out to be never statistically significant in the model. These results 
do not provide enough empirical evidence supporting our first 
hypothesis (H1) but suggest one major observation: the effects 
of network size and density must be distinguished, as the former 
affects to a larger extent older citizens’ party membership, whereas 
the latter seems more relevant to approaching youth party engage-
ment. It will be further argued that this finding should, in fact, be 
discussed in the light of the nature of ties binding the structure. 
Indeed, network size is a relevant variable to consider in the pro-
cess of party membership when people get older and have built 
larger interpersonal networks. Larger networks suppose more 
weak ties, more alters belonging to different social circles and are 
thus less likely to know each other because of their social distance 
(picturing a larger network horizon). This  situation translates into 
sparser networks for people under 35 years, a less important effect 
of density, but more of network size. From this, as already sug-
gested by bivariate statistics, a pool of weak ties might be expected 
to be the determinant for a network to trigger party membership, 
but rather for older people. Overall, our finding is in line with 
those showing that a larger set of relations per se is a determinant 
for being integrated into the political process, enlarging the pool 
from which the mobilising trigger can be activated, diversifying 
and or reinforcing surrounding political views, attitudes, beliefs 
or norms (McClurg 2003). Nonetheless, the analysis shows that 
this effect holds mainly for older citizens and not for the youth. 
In contrast, the latter have smaller networks, dominated by strong 
ties, therefore implying more density likely to affect their party 
mobilisation. Having denser rather than larger networks might be 
hypothesised as a crucial explanation of why young people tend 
to get involved (especially if this dense network is made up of 
politically active agents), but also to remain aside from politics. As 
the influence on party membership comes rather from strong ties 
(see below), or (a rather small number of ) very close peers who 
probably know each other because they are kin (which explains 
the higher coefficient for network density among the youth, 
meaning more social pressure to conform), if this proximate 
 micro-environment is not positively orientated towards politics, a 
phenomenon that is increasingly recognised at the aggregate and 
individual level in Western democracies (Norris 2011; Ezrow/ 
Xezonakis 2016), there are great chances that this young person 
will remain isolated from the political process by the effect of 
 social influence and pressure.
If controlling for network peers’ party membership, the signifi-
cant effect of network size remains stable, and is even reinforced. 
It thus provides empirical support that the higher the propor-
tion of alters that are party members in a network, the higher the 
Figure 2 (für bessere Qualität) 
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Figure 2: Distribution of (positive) attribute homophily (IV)
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chances for ego to join a party as well. This finding is replicated 
across all age categories and confirms a major trend stressed by 
innovation studies (Rogers 2003), epidemiology (Valente 1995), 
but also by election network scholars studying voting contagion 
(Nickerson 2008): being exposed in a larger extent to a certain 
behaviour in a social network increases the odds for the network 
nodes to comply with each other and adopt the same behaviour. 
Network composition: social homophily
The regression model reveals important findings regarding the 
role of social homophily in the process of joining a party. In ab-
solute terms, citizens relying on a socially homophilic network 
show a negative propensity to be affiliated to a political party. In 
contrast, what seems to matter to turn party member is rather 
having a diverse network in terms of age (highly see 6), gender 
(relatively s.) and education (negative coefficient but n.s). Look-
ing more closely at the results for both age groups under scrutiny 
(18-34y vs 35-65+), the analysis allows some refinement of the 
above-mentioned effects. First, although a larger coefficient for 
younger respondents, age homophily prevents significantly more 
membership among older respondents. Second, the negative rela-
tionship between gender homophily and party membership turns 
out to be statistically significant only for young participants, 
stressing the other way around how gender diversity might appear 
as a crucial feature to trigger youth party membership. Third, edu-
cation homophily turns statistically significant for older respond-
Table 6 
 
 18-34 35 and more  
Network 
structure 
B (SE) OR B (SE) OR B (SE) OR B (SE) OR B (SE) OR B (SE) OR 
Size .029 
(.017) 
1.136 .106*** 
(.024) 
1.112 .088*** 
(.124) 
1.092 .032 
(.059) 
1.032 .079*** 
(.025) 
1.082 .127*** 
(.026) 
1.136 
Density .159 
(.173) 
1.172 .115 
(.179) 
1.122 .124 
(.183) 
1.133 .470 
(.385) 
1.600 .069 
(.189) 
1.072 .119 
(.198) 
1.126 
Network composition 
Social homophily 
Age   -.296 
(.158) 
.744 -2.158*** 
(.456) 
.116 -4.623 
(3.177) 
.010 -2.039** .130 -1.929*** 
(.481) 
.145 
Gender   -.211 
(.156) 
.810 -1.251** 
(.475) 
.286 -3.444* 
(1.580) 
.032 -.865 
(.490) 
.421 -1.086* 
(.503) 
.337 
Education   -.448** 
(.168) 
.639 -.887 
(.596) 
.412 1.156 
(1.335) 
3.177 -1.309* 
(.645) 
.270 -.544 
(.628) 
.581 
Political homophily 
Interest   -.158 
(.133) 
.854 -2.554*** 
(.536) 
.078 -5.429*** 
(1.700) 
.004 -1.985*** 
(.523) 
.137 -1.649*** 
(.540) 
.192 
Satisfaction   .400** 
(.164) 
1.492 -2.060 
(3.57) 
.127 2.838 
(8.091) 
17.074 -3.812 
(4.012) 
.022 -3.290 
(3.759) 
.037 
Identification   1.076*** 
(.118) 
2.932 .027 
(.311) 
1.027 -.681 
(.991) 
.506 -.104 
(.323) 
.901 .424 
(.320) 
1.528 
  Social homophily (+) 
Age     .872*** 
(.186) 
2.393 3.938 
(2.732) 
41.336 .730** 
(.316) 
2.076 .690*** 
(.197) 
1.994 
Gender     2.027* 
(.861) 
7.591 5.661* 
(2.691) 
287.504 1.493 
(895) 
4.452 1.552* 
(.916) 
4.722 
Education     .196 
(.218) 
1.217 -.491 
(.477) 
.612 .344 
(.238) 
1.411 .094 
(.233) 
1.099 
Political homophily (+) 
Interest     .835*** 
(.171) 
2.305 1.740*** 
(.523) 
5.700 .629*** 
(.168) 
1.876 .551*** 
(.175) 
1.734 
Satisfaction     .959 
(1.435) 
2.610 -.961 
(3.243) 
.383 1.647 
(1.615) 
5.189 1.459 
(1.512) 
4.302 
Identification     1.073*** 
(.313) 
2.923 1.981* 
(.991) 
7.247 1.138*** 
(.328) 
3.122 .316 
(.327) 
1.372 
Membership 
exposure 
          2.578*** 
(.181) 
13.17
4 
Constant -1.944***  
(.157) 
.143 -2.799*** 
(.195) 
.061 -2.614*** 
(.196) 
.073 -3.184*** 
(.409) 
.041 -2.297*** 
(.328) 
.101 -3.346*** 
(224) 
.035 
χ2 152.826  206.723  176.995  60.170  139.965  222.350  
R2 Nagelkerke .3  7.9  13.8  18.8  11.4  27.1  
N 2801  2801  2801  814  1987  2801  
Table 6: Logistic regression table (M1) – DV = party membership (binary)
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ents only (negative coefficient), meaning that networks which 
are homogeneous in terms of education decrease older respond-
ents’ probability of membership. Interestingly, the coefficient for 
 education homophily turns positive for the youngest but is not 
statistically significant.
Although these findings point towards more prominence of so-
cial heterogeneity playing the process of joining a party, the part 
of the model taking into consideration whether social homoph-
ily is “positive”, i.e. revealing homogeneity in higher categories 
of social attributes, does provide another story compared to the 
previous step. The results emphasise how networks’ homogene-
ous social composition can work in sparking party membership, 
but actually by reproducing, at the network level, aggregate and 
individual-level social inequalities well-known in party member-
ship studies – especially regarding the involvement of the youth 
as well as the male bias. Overall, the more network congruence 
on higher categories of age (highly s.), gender (relatively s.), and 
education (positive coefficient but n.s.), the more ego’s chances 
of joining a political party. These results corroborate, at least par-
tially at this point, the second hypothesis about the effect of ho-
mophily: when social homophily with higher socio-demographic 
background is observed, the statistical relationship with party 
membership turns positive. These results can be read in the light 
of membership shortage and interpreted as showing that, in fact, 
most party organisations are doomed to recruit predominantly 
among the most “usual suspects” (Campbell 2013) of their na-
tional population: the oldest, the men and the most educated. 
The social networks of their current members connect them to 
a pool of prospective members that have largely the same social 
profile, struggling therefore to diversify their social basis and to 
reach alternative targets that might join the organisation. Disag-
gregating between both age groups, some refinements can be put 
forward. First, positive age homophily encourages significantly 
only the membership of older respondents, and this is so despite 
a larger coefficient for the youth. Overall, (positive) age homo-
phily does not encourage or impede statistically the youth party 
membership process in our model. In contrast, second, homoph-
ily based on the male sex greatly increases the odds of joining for 
young people, while the smaller, positive coefficient of the older 
group does not remain statistically significant. It implies that the 
individual-level gender bias in favour of the men found in many 
party membership studies works also at the level of social net-
works, but affects statistically significantly more the membership 
process of young respondents. Finally, although never statistical-
ly significant, the homophily based on higher level of education 
displays a positive relationship to party membership throughout 
the model, turning nonetheless negative when young citizens are 
strictly analysed. The latter observation might be related to studies 
showing that the aggregate increase of education levels did not 
translate into more membership at the individual level (Persson 
2014), especially among the youth. In the same way, we might 
argue that a higher network-level of education for younger gener-
ations does not coincide with a higher probability for them to join 
a party - and might even imply the opposite relations (negative 
coefficient, but n.s.), because educational attainment is probably 
a merely individual-level characteristic: citizens attend school and 
earn diplomas “alone”. Education is thus an issue for what social 
networks can bring to our explanation of political participation, 
except if we think about the status conferred by the education en-
vironment (Campbell 2013). One hypothesis to further explore 
seems that nowadays young people are embedded in networks 
where the level of education plays a less determinant role for driv-
ing their behaviours towards political parties than was the case for 
their older fellows, mainly because it does not confer on them the 
same social status.
Network composition: political homophily
Regarding political homophily, the results must be distinguished 
depending on the type of political attitudes, as they are more con-
trasted. First, the relationship between homophily based on po-
litical interest and party membership is the most clear-cut. If the 
analysis supports rather that relying on homogeneous networks 
in terms of political interest per se decreases the odds of joining a 
party - all the more for younger respondents (larger negative coef-
ficient than older ones) – when the level on which the similarity 
occurs is taken into account (i.e. positive or not), the outcome 
shows that homophily based on higher levels of political inter-
est does increase the chances of joining a party, especially among 
younger respondents who have a higher positive coefficient and 
odds ratio than older ones. Second, regarding homophily based on 
political satisfaction, results are more difficult to grasp. The varia-
ble measuring homophily based on this attitude in absolute terms 
loses its statistical significance and becomes negatively associated 
with party membership when the term measuring whether the 
homophily is positive (congruence on higher levels of satisfaction) 
is included. Despite being not statistically significant, the last step 
of the model gives some empirical credit to the idea that similar-
ity on higher levels of satisfaction affects positively the chances 
to be recruited by a political party. It seems to hold, however, 
more for old than young respondents, for which the coefficient 
turns negative when the analysis is run independently. Hence, the 
results suggest that it might be negative homophily (i.e. on lower 
levels of satisfaction, suggesting that ego is importantly exposed 
to a feeling of disenchantment towards democracy in his/her 
micro-environment) that is rather a network pattern that spurs 
youth party membership. In contrast, when young people tend 
to be homogeneously surrounded by positive feelings towards de-
mocracy, they probably do not feel the need or interest to mind 
the gap and engage themselves in institutionalised politics. More 
largely, other analyses performed on these data have shown that 
how people perceive their network in terms of satisfaction is a cru-
cial determinant for explaining why citizens favour protest forms 
of political participation as well as identifying with more extreme 
parties (Paulis/Close 2018). Third and finally, in absolute terms, 
homophily based on party identification increases the chances of 
joining a political party. The positive coefficient nonetheless los-
es its statistical significance in favour of the variable measuring 
whether the congruence takes place on a positive score of identi-
fication (meaning that network fellows similarly identified with a 
party). Indeed, the latter variable is highly statistically significant, 
even when younger and older respondents are distinguished. The 
odds ratio and the coefficient support a stronger impact on youth 
party membership though. From this, it can be interpreted again 
The social networks of their current members connect 
them to a pool of prospective members that have largely 
the same social profile, struggling therefore to diversify 
their social basis and to reach alternative targets[.]
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that parties are quite exclusive in their recruitment as they enlist 
from among the “usual suspects” of their national population: the 
most interested (significantly more among the youth), the most 
satisfied (except for the youngest) and those who identified with 
a party (slightly stronger among the youth). The political homo-
geneity of their current members’ social networks prevents them 
from reaching alternative political profiles and diversifying the 
political views that are integrated into their organisation. 
The empirical analysis clearly demonstrated that, to a certain 
 extent and under certain conditions, homophily can be a network 
compositional configuration that affects party membership by re-
producing, at the network level, social and political inequalities 
usually established by individual or aggregate patterns, supporting 
the third hypothesis (H3). Controlling for the proportion of party 
members in the network did not modify significantly our find-
ings, except that network variables related to party identification 
quite logically lose their statistical significance. More importantly, 
it allows our general model to double the Nagelkerke-explained 
variance from 13.8% to 27.1% (see Table 6).
Network composition: social ties
To avoid overloading the first, a second set of models (M2) is de-
veloped to answer which type of ties is the most important channel 
of youth party membership. Single terms (see Table 7 below) per-
taining to the different social ties included in the first step suggest 
that respondents who mention more acquaintances have a higher 
probability of being a party member, but that this effect is mainly 
true of older respondents. We have earlier argued that this might 
be closely related to the effect of network size, the impact of which 
on party membership also holds only for older respondents. The 
latter having larger networks, they have also a higher likelihood of 
reporting social distance in their networks, and therefore of having 
the presence of acquaintances affecting positively their probability 
of joining a political party. More interestingly, when the interac-
[W]hen young people tend to be homogeneously sur­
rounded by positive feelings towards democracy, they 
probably do not feel the need or interest to […] engage 
themselves in institutionalised politics.
Table 7: Logistic regression table (M2) - DV = party membership
 18-34y 35-65+ 
 B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR 
Spouse .154 
(.105) 
1.167 .263* 
(.113) 
1.300 .111 
(.141) 
1.118 .399 
(.359) 
1.490 .066 
(.158) 
1.069 
DNA relative -.047 
(.036) 
.954 .030 
(.037) 
1.030 -.076 
(.049) 
.927 -.290 
(.155) 
.748 -.056 
(.052) 
.945 
Extended family .022 
(.033) 
1.022 .064 
(.035) 
1.063 -.008 
(.045) 
.992 -.107 
(.147) 
.467 -.016 
(.048) 
.984 
Friend .033 
(.021) 
1.034 .082*** 
(.023) 
1.086 .003 
(.028) 
1.003 .007 
(.065) 
1.007 .013 
(.032) 
1.013 
Colleague -.012 
(.045) 
.988 .012 
(.049) 
1.012 -.069 
(.065) 
.933 -.058 
(.157) 
.944 -.073 
(.073) 
.929 
Member .215*** 
(.040) 
1.240 .173*** 
(.045) 
1.189 .059 
(.065) 
1.060 .133 
(.239) 
1.142 .007 
(.072) 
1.007 
Advisor .058 
(.053) 
1.081 .070 
(.057) 
1.035 .041 
(.075) 
1.042 .234 
(.196) 
1.264 -.099 
(.094) 
.906 
Acquaintance .288 
(.157) 
1.333 -.042 
(.174) 
.959 .732** 
(.246) 
2.079 1.407 
(1.057) 
4.085 .665** 
(.256) 
1.944 
Peers’ membership   3.380*** 
(.211) 
29.372 1.698*** 
(.323) 
5.465 2.166*** 
(.574) 
8.726 1.523*** 
(.429) 
4.588 
Spouse X 
membership 
    .800 
(.447) 
2.225 -1.084 
(.923) 
.338 1.471** 
(.575) 
4.352 
DNA relative X 
membership 
    .731*** 
(.215) 
2.077 1.112** 
(.413) 
3.040 .773** 
(.262) 
2.167 
Extended family X 
membership 
    .383* 
(.189) 
1.466 .963 
(.536) 
2.620 .306 
(.206) 
1.357 
Friend X 
membership 
    .494*** 
(.114) 
1.639 .388 
(.222) 
1.474 .453** 
(.134) 
1.573 
 Colleague X 
membership 
    .324 
(.236) 
1.383 .498 
(.452) 
1.645 .376 
(.291) 
1.456 
Member X 
membership 
    .444* 
(.216) 
1.559 .014 
(.546) 
1.014 .617* 
(.268) 
1.853 
Advisor X 
membership 
    .061 
(.268) 
1.063 -1.807** 
(.837) 
.164 .904* 
(.399) 
2.469 
Acquaintance X 
membership 
    -2.067** 
(.836) 
.127 -1.777 
(2.143) 
.169 -2.274* 
(1.078) 
.103 
Constant -1.948*** 
(.113) 
.143 -2.752*** 
(.143) 
.064 -2.359*** 
(.145) 
.094 -3.001*** 
(.355) 
.050 -2.147*** 
(1.61) 
.117 
χ2 298.319  369.270  265.528  71.642  178.913  
R2 Nagelkerke (%) 2.3  18.5  22.6  25.1  24.3  
N 2801  2801  2801  814  1987  
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tion term between the type of ties and alters’ party membership is 
considered, the analysis does not confirm that acquaintanceship 
with party members conveys membership to ego, confirming 
somehow that reporting a larger pool of acquaintances appears as 
a corollary pattern of having a larger network size, which both 
per se affects positively the odds of joining a party (for older citi-
zens only). Nonetheless, in contrast, the party membership of two 
other weaker connections (advisor and organisation member) ap-
pears to be statistically significant and positively related to party 
membership, although the impact remains significant for older 
respondents only. This finding reinforces the argument that weak 
ties are relevant channels triggering party membership, but that 
networks as a vector of social capital become effective when people 
get older (larger networks, more weak ties).
It does not mean so far that the influence of strong ties must be 
denied. The regression table (Table 7) puts forward that there is 
evidence to claim that party membership is also driven by peo-
ple to whom citizens are closely connected, especially among the 
youth (supporting H2). Among the older generation, the spouse’s 
party membership is the first channel of membership, whereas 
youth party membership is boosted by the affiliation of DNA and 
extended family. As suggested earlier, this might also explain why 
network size is not statistically significant for younger respondents 
(but also why they had a larger positive coefficient for network 
density). The structure of their networks influences much less 
their odds of joining than its composition. From this, it might be 
argued that a major reason for explaining why young people stay 
away from traditional politics is because their proximate network 
core (i.e. their family and relatives) does not connect them to these 
traditional organisations, and that only a small proportion of the 
“privileged” is. Cross and Young (2008) suggested the hypothesis 
that access to parties through family members might have, in fact, 
increased in importance in recent decades, as more than 50% of 
party members under 25 years old who were surveyed in their 
research reported to have been recruited through family connec-
tions, compared to only 9% among older members. This striking 
generational discrepancy is deservedly questioned as to whether 
youth party membership would mirror an increased exclusivity 
in party recruitment patterns, despite many attempts to diversi-
fy and ease the barriers for entering these organisations. In that 
sense, youth party membership would respond nowadays more to 
a family habit, or tradition, than a genuine political commitment. 
The case of Belgium in itself can also help to untangle the signif-
icant role played by family ties. First, there is a high proportion 
of “filiations” (“son/daughter of”) that can be found among pol-
iticians, candidates, and members, from the local to the national 
level (Wauters/Van Liefferinge 2015). Even if it has never been 
systematically quantified in a longitudinal manner or explored 
from a cultural point of view, this phenomenon greatly questions 
the diversity of the profiles that are drawn by Belgian political 
parties, feeding sometimes among ordinary citizens the image of 
“dynastic bias” within parties (Dal Bó et al. 2009). Second, the 
pillarisation of Belgian society has long implied that member-
ship via relatives was a common way to join political parties for 
younger members, who were then directly enlisted on behalf of 
their parents, or indirectly via various satellite organisations (Van 
Haute et al. 2013). Furthermore, since the membership process 
became more individualised, membership fees are generally low-
ered as long as other relatives join or are already members.
Conclusion
In a context where traditional political participation is in decline, 
this paper addressed whether social networks, as sets of interper-
sonal relationships among individuals, are relevant channels for 
party membership, and in particular among the youth. Based 
on original cross-sectional survey data (N=2,801), the analysis 
 explored how the structure and the homogeneous composition of 
citizens’ social networks can generate or impede their engagement 
in a political party, with a specific comparison between young 
(18-34 years) and older citizens (35-65+). Three major findings 
concerning youth party membership can be summarised and 
 further discussed in the light of their implications for recruit-
ment, thereby contributing to both the supply- and demand-side 
of  party membership literature.
First, compared to older respondents, party membership of 
younger citizens was not statistically influenced by the network 
structure. It was explained by the fact that the process is most-
ly driven by proximate social peers, to which they are tied via 
strong ties. Hence, second, the dominance of strong ties in the 
youth party membership process was seen as evidence of a certain 
exclusivity in recruitment patterns of political parties, which is 
likely to give insight on why many young citizens stay away from 
institutionalised forms of participation (highly dependent on the 
social and political composition of their proximate network core, 
i.e. their family). Indeed, third and finally, the homogeneous 
 nature of their network composition, especially when the network 
is congruent to a high social and political profile, was shown to 
affect significantly their probability of joining a party. Nonethe-
less, the analysis showed that, under certain circumstances, social 
networks do affect the reproduction of social and political ine-
qualities, confining recruitment targets to the most usual suspects 
of the population, and thereby explaining some of the difficulties 
of recruitment faced by Belgian party organisations.
Given the picture drawn by this paper, a perspective to consider 
in order to deal with the lack of youth involvement in traditional 
politics is to continue promoting institutional arrangements that 
are likely to ensure the enlargement, diversification and fostering 
of young adults’ social networks throughout their schooling, and 
hence not only among the “most usual” suspects. Encouraging 
the development of exchanges between school classes of different 
neighbourhoods, the democratisation of mobility for students and 
early young workers, or indeed the interpersonal meeting of ex-
perts, politicians, social workers or professionals might be different 
aspects of a strategy to lower the time that network size might 
become effective in the political mobilisation of these categories of 
the population. In terms of social profiles, along with a continuous 
work towards the youth in general, an important target for Bel-
gian political parties should be young women (18-35y.) and their 
friendship networks, in as much as the network gender bias affects 
statistically significantly more the younger respondents’ member-
ship process. This makes all the more sense given new institutional 
rules implemented in Belgium, which try to ensure more gender 
diversity in politics (Van Der Dussen 2013). A long-term targeted 
strategy on social media might be one way to cope with this chal-
[S]ocial networks do affect the reproduction of social 
and political inequalities, confining recruitment targets 
to the most usual suspects of the population[.]
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lenge in practice. In terms of political profiles, the results recorded 
hypothesised that political parties attract young citizens that are 
integrated in networks of people homogeneously not satisfied with 
the way Belgian democracy is currently working. However, behind 
this positive sketch, an important undertaking would be to see 
which types of parties are joined when the network homogeneity 
tends towards dissatisfaction with democracy. Moreover, it would 
appear that political parties could actually try to mobilise more 
among networks that homogeneously embedded young people in 
a positive attitude towards democracy. More pragmatically, young 
party members joining political parties and being surrounded by 
people who tend to be politically interested and who identify with 
a party, fighting against the negative citizen perception of parties 
(exacerbated currently in Belgium because of various controversial 
issues and frequent government crises) by, among other things, 
improving the diversity and representativeness of elected officials 
(and not only of candidates) – thereby attracting wider identifica-
tion – or by promoting newer forms and practices of democracy 
– thereby attracting more interest – might be represent a posi-
tive thread to follow in the attempt to mobilise through networks 
where apolitical and/or less interested young citizens are found. 
Finally, given that family ties are the most relevant channels of 
youth party membership, a last strategy to consider in order to 
break with the image of “dynasties” sometimes attached to Belgian 
parties is to work continuously on activating weak ties between 
their current members, among other things, by organising ad hoc 
social and mentoring activities (offline) or by using online tools 
that can help these political organisations to reach new and young-
er voters, supporters and members via the online friendship and 
acquaintanceship networks of their current members.
Notes
1 The appendix summarises the whole procedure, the exact word-
ing of the question, and the derived variables’ operationalisation 
stemming from this process of network data collection. For the 
appendix, see page 23.
2 Spouse, close relative (DNA family), member of my extended 
family, friend, colleague, member of an organisation to which I 
belong, professional advisor, acquaintance, or other.
3 Please note that one item (“I don’t know”) was added for each 
question, except for socio-demographics. Alters for which infor-
mation was unknown were removed from derived measurements. 
Alters’ descriptive statistics refer only to valid per cent. Hence, 
respondents for whom the information on a given attribute is un-
known for the whole network were recoded as missing.
4 Respondents had to specify at least one name to carry out the 
whole survey.
5 Bivariate ANOVA tests statistically significant when com paring 
network size means by categories (p=.001), but not regarding 
density (p=.091).
6 Please note abbreviations shown in brackets from this point on: 
“s.” (statistically significant) and “n.s.” (non statistically signifi-
cant).
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Appendix - Network data collection and operationalisation   
Name-generating procedure Survey question Network structure Network composition Network composition 
(derived) 
  Size Density Homophily 
(EI index) 
Attribute Homophily Positive 
homophily 
1) Name 
generator 
 
Could you give us the first 
names of maximum 10 
people who are 
particularly important in 
your life, with whom you 
socialised during the last 6 
months? 
N social 
peers 
     
List of significant 
social peers (alters) 
   
2) Name 
interpreter 
 
Nature or strength of 
the ties between the 
respondent and the 
alters (ego-alters ties) 
Below, there is a list of 
ways people can be tied to 
each other. Some people 
can be connected through 
different ties at the same 
time. For instance, 
someone could be your 
sister, belonging to the 
same sports club as you, 
but also be your work 
colleague. For all the 
people you named in the 
first question, could you 
specify the type of tie(s) 
that mainly link(s) you 
(the most salient)? 
   Mean value 
by network 
around each 
tie attribute 
  
 
 
Social and political 
attributes of each 
alter 
Traditional questions 
about socio-demographic 
background, political 
attitudes and behaviours. 
Exact same question 
wording and answer items 
for ego and alters. 
 
NB: “I don’t know” 
added for alters. 
  Egos whose alters 
are mostly 
similar to them 
with respect to 
social and 
political 
attributes will 
have high 
homophily scores 
(+1) while those 
with more 
heterophily in 
their ego-
networks will 
have a value 
closer to -1. 
Mean value 
by network 
around each 
node 
attribute 
EI index 
recoded into 
binary form.  
1= 
homophilic 
network;  
0 = 
heterophilic 
network. 
Whether 
homophily 
occurs on high 
attribute 
scores or 
categories; 
recoded into 
binary form: 
1= yes; 
0= no. 
3) Name 
interrelater 
 
Could you specify if the 
people you named know 
each other? 
 Actual 
ties 
divided 
by 
potential 
ties 
 
    
Ties among alters, i.e. 
whether they know 
each other (or not) 
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